Appointments Speech

Senator Rónán Mullen 28/10/2009

It has been said with some justification that patronage and the abuse of appointment to public office is the curse of our political system. Senator Ross, in this bill, has made a genuine and significant attempt at reform.

Before dealing with the substantive areas of the Bill I want to cast an eye over the nature of the bodies addressed in this bill. In any democracy elements of government are delegated to panels of experts, delegated in order to allow close scrutiny of the matters in question by people who are able and interested but not weighted down with the demands of an office of state. However, since the early days of this state the cynical amongst us have predicted that these appointments will be held for venal rather than altruistic reasons, and too often they have been proven right. A modern example of this is the practice of appointing members of boards, including semi-state companies and prison visiting committees, who are resident many miles from the meeting place of those committees, resulting in huge travel expenses in addition to the stipend payable. This huge financial cost to the public purse compounds the damage done to public welfare by having good people kept off these boards by the less able, but better connected.

In considering the abuses of these appointments one must acknowledge the work done by the majority of post-holders who are sincere in their dedication, and attend faithfully and with little thanks to the demands of their post. It is not possible, or indeed desirable to centralise all decision making in the hands of the Executive. We entrust the operation of many critical organisations to these people, and in the main they have served us well.

This point leads me onto the present bill which is very impressive, and especially the central tenet of the bill - that outside, independent scrutiny be available for all appointments. Some years ago we were faced the controversy that led to the creation of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, an development that was intended to remove the problem of political considerations impinging on appointments to the Bench. While the creation of the JAAB was well meaning, it is fair to say that many consider that the political element remains. [the JAAB was created in the wake of the fall of Albert Reynolds government and the controversy caused by the appointment of Harry Whelehan to the bench. According to the Irish Independent cronyism is rife and canvassing, including by TDs continues]. This Bill addresses this, with the power of appointment lying with a Joint Oireachtas Committee, rather than the independent body making a non-binding recommendation to cabinet as is the case with the JAAB. 

The provisions set out in section 13 regarding the appointments criteria is something I support, and indeed in it I see the possibility of opening up the state boards to a far wider range of people than sit there currently. The disclosure of political activities and interests is important, but more importantly is the correct identification of the positive attributes the prospective appointees will bring to the job. In relation to that I would add that the “appointment plans” mentioned in section 12, which are to be drawn up by the relevant departments, should include an analysis of what is sought in appointees. In “business-speak” I am talking about the equivalent of “job specifications” and “person specifications” to enable the man on the street to assess where he can best contribute, and to allow the Committee to assess if the nominees are suitable.

One area I would urge caution is the area of accountability. The FAS scandal has shown the propensity of government to wash their hands of anything that can safely be blamed on the board of an autonomous organisation. Perhaps the drafter might consider an amendment to section 5, which provides for the Minister to remain ultimately responsible

for the appointments to public bodies, to create a mechanism whereby this responsibility has a practical element. A possible manifestation of this practical element, borrowed from corporate governance theory, is that the Chairs of these committees appointed by the Committee be specifically required to report to the relevant Minister on the functioning of the board in addition to their existing requirements.

In conclusion, abuse of patronage is not a new problem, and modern manifestations of the so-called “battle of Baltinglass” haunt us still. Senator Ross, when he speaks of the loss of confidence in existing procedures is correct, and it is my desire that this bill be seriously considered as a means of addressing this problem.